CALL FOR PAPERS FOR A SPECIAL ISSUE OF BUSINESS & SOCIETY
The Governance Challenges of Corporate Political Activity
Guest Editors:
Nicolas Dahan
Long Island University, CW Post Campus, New York, USA
Michael Hadani
Long Island University, CW Post Campus, New York, USA
Douglas A. Schuler
Rice University, Texas, USA
Background
We solicit papers about a host of governance
issues raised by the practice of corporate political activity.
Following a May, 2010 colloquium about corporate
political activity, held at Long Island
University, CW Post Campus, New York, and
organized by the Guest Editors of this Special
Issue of Business & Society (Note, this is the
4th international colloquium on corporate
political activity. Business & Society has
published papers from previous colloquia.), we
seek papers about governance issues regarding
corporate political activity at two levels of
analysis. The first level of analysis is a broad
societal perspective, which follows from the fact
that the political activities of firms oftentimes
raise issues about public governance. How does
the prevalence of corporate political activity
fit into a healthy democracy (Ostas, 2007)? Do
firms have a legitimate right to influence public
policy (Mitchell, 1997)? What are the benefits
and negative consequences to society of firms
being involved in politics? Is there a point
where firms become excessively influential,
gaining private benefits at the expense of the
common interest (Barley, 2007)? Can corporate
political activity be seen as part of the
emergence of a wider trend of civil regulation,
complementing the shortfalls of state regulations
(Vogel, 2009), or is it merely self- serving? Are
there countervailing forces to corporate
political activity, such as the political
activities of non-governmental organizations?
The second unit of analysis about the
relationship between governance and corporate
political activity is at the firm level.
Corporate political activity is part of a set of
activities that many firms, especially large
ones, perform routinely. While both top managers
and specialized managers such as in government
relations units generally drive such political
activities, these activities should ultimately be
assessed and controlled by corporate boards. This
internal analysis raises an important question
about corporate political activity: Does
corporate political activity drive value for the
firm and its shareholders? From this question
flow a number of ancillary questions: How can
firms measure the value of corporate political
activity? Are there secondary effects of
corporate political activity, such as on the
firms non-governmental stakeholders, that create
value for the firm? How should the corporate
political activity function be governed by the
firm? Should shareholders have the right to
support or reject the support of certain
political candidates with corporate funds or
funds designated for political use (such as the
political action committee [PAC] funds raised by company managers)?
The topic of governance and corporate political
activity is both current and important. Current
insofar as public and private governance issues
are an increasing concern of policy-makers,
managers, and scholars. At the broad, societal
level, we see more systemic attempts to reign in
corporate political activity, or to include,
along with business interests, non-business
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in global
talks about climate and trade. At the firm level,
the topic emerges from the multiple corporate
scandals of mismanagement and gaps in corporate
governance (Enron), as well as government
oversight (AIG, Bear Stearns), on top of the
usual questions of improper conduct between
corporate managers and public officials (e.g.,
corruption, corporate wining and dining in
politics: see Dal Bó et al., 2006; Drew, 2000;
Nelson et al., 2002; Stone, 2006) occurring in
the past decade. The issue of the governance of
corporate political activity has gained a renewed
interest in the United States as the Obama
administration has made the improvement of
ethical standards in policy-making as well as
stricter governmental oversight of business
activities two of the top priorities of their
agenda. This topic is important not only to the
United States but also to any democracy, as it
questions the place that private sector firms
play in them and whether this place should evolve going forward.
References
Barley, Stephen R. (2007). Corporations,
Democracy and the Public Good, Journal of Management Inquiry, 16(3): 201-15.
Dal Bó, Ernesto, Dal Bó, Pedro and Di Tella,
Rafael (2006). Plata o Plomo?: Bribe and
Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence,
American Political Science Review, 100(1): 41-53.
Drew, Elizabeth (2000). The Corruption of
American Politics: What Went Wrong and Why, New York: The Overlook Press.
Mitchell, Neil J. (1997). The Conspicuous
Corporation: Business, Public Policy, and
Representative Democracy, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.
Nelson, Candice J., Dulio, David A. and Medvic,
Stephen K. (eds., 2002). Shades of Gray:
Perspectives on Campaign Ethics, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Ostas, Daniel T. (2007). The Law and Ethics of K
Street: Lobbying, the First Amendment, and the
Duty to Create Just Laws, Business Ethics Quarterly, 17(1): 33-63.
Stone, Peter H. (2006). Heist: Superlobbyist Jack
Abramoff, His Republican Allies, and the Buying
of Washington, New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux.
Vogel, David (2009). The Private Regulation of
Global Corporate Conduct, in The Politics of
Global Regulation, Walter Mattli and Ngaire
Woods, (eds.), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Contributions Sought for the Special Issue
Without excluding other related topics, we would
seek contributions to advance the discussion of
two major areas of CPA and governance:
1. Relationship between the firm and
non-firm societal actors including NGOs and governments.
Papers here might include such questions and topics as:
· How has the presence and oversight of a
companys (industrys) business by NGOs affected
how the firms conduct their CPA?
· How have voluntary self-regulatory
schemes affected CPA, especially in cross-national cases?
· What is the impact of CPA on democracies?
· What kind of public governance does CPA
contributes to create? In particular, is the
emergence of private authority and civil
regulation as alternatives to state regulation
desirable? Are they effective substitutes?
· Are there conditions where CPA be
considered socially acceptable and/or ethical?
· Comparative studies of national
political arrangements where CPA is accepted and practiced differently
· Corporate influence over the regulation
of CPA (e.g., in the USA and at the EU level recently)
· Comparative studies of CPA and public
governance arrangements between democracies and
authoritarian regimes: Do they fundamentally
differ? Should firms adapt their CPA to
authoritarian regimes or uphold the same high
standards than in democratic regimes?
· What are the effects of CPA on a firms
relationship with non-governmental stakeholders?
2. Relationship between internal governance aspects of the firm and CPA.
Papers here might include such questions and topics as:
· What is the best way to organize the CPA
function to create firm value?
· How might CPA be measured and evaluated
by top managers and the board of directors?
· How does the composition of the board of directors affect CPA?
· Do shareholders have any rights over the
firms political expenditures?
· Comparative studies of national
regulations of CPA: How and why do they differ?
We invite both theoretical and empirical
contributions that help us to better understand
how various governance aspects affect corporate
political activity. We invite papers from a
variety of perspectives, including management and
strategy, sociology, political science, law,
economics, and other areas. The papers are
subject to the regular double-blind review process of Business & Society.
Submission Instructions
The format of the papers must follow Business &
Society guidelines. Business & Society uses the
American Psychological Association citation and reference system.
Papers should include a 100-150 word abstract
followed by 3 to 5 keywords. The paper itself
should contain no indications of authorship.
A title page containing full author contact
information should be sent as a separate document to the co-editors.
Deadlines/Timetable
November 15,
2010 Papers are due
per electronic submission to the co-editors
November, 2010 Fall 2011 Review and revision process
2012
(tentative)
Publication of Business & Society Special Issue.
Contact Addresses
Questions about the Special Issue can be
addressed to either one of these co-editors:
Dr. Nicolas Dahan
Long Island University CW Post Campus
College of Management
720 Northern Boulevard
Brookville, NY 11548-1300 USA
Email: nicolas.dahan.liu.edu
or
Dr. Douglas A. Schuler
Rice University
Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business
P. O. Box 2932
Houston, TX 77252 USA
Email.
schuler@rice.edu
DISTRIBUTED BY DUANE WINDSOR, RICE UNIVERSITY, FOR BUSINESS & SOCIETY